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In a contribution to Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller's 
recent volume Conflicts in Feminism, Ann Snitow observes that 
"the urgent contradiction which women constantly experience 
between the pressure to be a woman and the.pressure not tn be one 
will change only through a historical process; it cannot he 
thought In this passage, Snitow has 
- identified a perennial problem in feminist politics, the problem 
of building a politics of liberation on women's female identity 
without falling into some kind of socio-biological essentialism. 
How are women to transform the idea of woman, which has for 
centuries stood as the justification for their-oppression, into a 
basis for political freedom, and social and economic equality? 
Within the academy, this question presents itself as a 
problem of language, as feminist scholars ponder how they might 
render gender "a useful category of analysis" without finding 
themselves and their subject trapped in the narrow, airless 
closet of womanhood as humanity's mysterious {if indispensable) 
"other." Joan Scott and Denise Riley have both sought lingl~istic 
exits from this discursively constructed dilemma, exanining the 
category "woman1' either with the sharp sword of deconstruction 
(Scott) or with the philosopher's more traditional weapon of 
analyzing how the shape and content of "woman" have alte,red over 
time.2 But the centrality of the category itself, whether 
contested with the sophisticated tools of linguist and 
philosopher, or embraced in its "womanist" (ie, woman-defined! 
incarnation, stands as the visible sign of a deeper problem; a 
problem of knowledge which hovers on the edges of recent 
scholarship yet remains largely unexplored. The politics of 
identity, feminist and otherwise, rests on a disturbing 
epistemological ground, where the group's fragile unity, rooted 
in an emergent sense of identity as oppressed other, is shielded 
from white male colonization by asserting the inaccessibility of 
one's experience. Only those who share the group identity, have 
lived its experience, whether seen as biologicslly given or 
socially constructed, can know what it means to be black/a 
woman/blue-collar/ethnic in a notionally WASP America. In this 
fashion, oppressed groups hsve organized powerful movements, 
countering the relentless barrage of myth about Gemocracy and 
equality in a land of opportuity with their own experience, put 
forward as a valid base for political action. 
The politics of identity has proven highly effective at 
revealing the multiple oppressions endemic in a social and 
political structure which cannot acknowledge its own deeply 
entrenched hierarchies. But this form of politics has its costs, 
and they are now emerging as people begin to ask some basic 
epistemological questions: what can and cannot be known, and by 
whom? What constitutes useful or irrelevant knowledge in a 
world where the icons of western civilization have been stripped 
of their pious, self-serving masks and revealed as the property 
(and cudgels) of the powerful? If we are to follow the politics 
of identity to its logical (if unstated) conclusion, the answer 
is clear: an individual's knowledge is co-terminous with her 
bodily identity. Knowledge is what we possess in our bones, what 
we have gleaned from our highly localized experiences as 
particular kinds of humans, hound by the biological or socially 
constructed chains of race, class and gender. Categories of 
difference are reified as humans get sorted into political an? 
knowledge-types, and the possibility of knowing across these 
bodily boundaries is implicitly denied. (The politics of 
identity is, after all, a defensive one, designed to protect 
fragile entities against the blustering incursions of white men.. 
They shall not pass.) 
The logical outcome is, of course, that there are as many 
ways of knowing as there are categories written in the socio- 
biological lexicon, and knowledge is discontinuous across the 
boundaries. We thus dwell in a kind of neo-platonic realm, where 
the kinds of knowledge one has access to are rooted in one's 
bodily being (color, gender, sexua1.ity). Although the categories 
have been historicized, identified as socially constructed, they 
have not yet been deposed from their crucial role as sites of 
consciousness-production. Indeed, since each of us is defined 
and delimited by class, race, and gender, and there can he no 
"Archimedean standpoint," no external and overarching locu of 
"Truth," the experiential content of these categories constitutes 
the sole source of authority. Each experiential territory is 
hermetically sealed off from the others, in order to protect the 
authority of one's experience from challenge or scrutiny,3 no 
illusion of universal human truth stands over and above, binding 
(however coercively) the subjective truths of our experience into 
some kind of coherent social whole. We post-modern types thus 
find ourselves in a Republic without Guardians, that Is, in a 
world where no one can apprehend the whole because no one can 
know (or approach) that which exceeds the bounds of her own 
experience. 
Joan Scott has observed, "Those who would write 'p~litics' 
out of professional life misunderstand the processes by which all 
knowledge, including knowledge of history, has heen produced,"" 
This is an important insight, against which her critics have 
fulminated in the name of value-free inquiry after a universal 
and singular Truth. This paper does not propose to contradict 
Scott's linkage of gender and history to politics, both within 
and outside the academy. Identity politics has been instrumental 
in formulating sharp critiques of a western political culture 
which has doggedly insisted on shrouding its white male structure 
in the cloak (and dagger) of universality. It is net something 
which feminists, as scholars and as political activists, should 
easily abandon. At the same time, it is worth remembering that 
the politics of identity has often managed to contain its 
protagonists in categorical descriptions which are as narrow and 
unbending as those offered by the conservative political systems 
it stands against. The fact that individuals can neither 
recognize themselves in these suffocating accounts, nor reach 
across the boundaries of bodily being and find recognition from 
one another, suggests what is in fact the case: that identity 
politics has merely inverted the hierarchy of categories and 
identities handed down by the very conservative politics it seeks 
to subvert. It shares with its enemy an implicit grounding in a 
traditional metaphysics of Truth, unchanging and eternal giver of 
categories, and of the self-enclosed, self-reflecting subject. 
.- 
Postmodern philosophies have tried to address this problem 
by identifying the search for a singular, reliable "truth, " 
standing beyond political contest or the duplicities of 
representation, as an "effect" of power (Foucault) or language 
(Derrida) . Hence, modern philosophies of consciousness 
(Descartes and Kant forward) understand truth to be that pure 
nugget of self-contained, self-reliant self-presence which 
remains once representation and empirical contingency have been 
abstracted out. By opposing this core of self-presence to the 
realm of chimerical sense perceptions and unreliable 
representations, philosophers have traditionally conceived truth 
as stable and unitary. But, as the postmodern individual knows 
only too well, representation (as language) is the condition on 
which our notion of truth rests. This transcendent entity cannot 
in fact lie outside the system it purports to stand above. 
For many scholars, this postmodern discnvery presents a grim 
and hopeless prospect. The death of the world, the fragmentation 
of the subject, and "the death of God (the divine Logos) 
profoundly influenced our language; the silence that replaced its 
source remains impenetrable . . .  Language thus assumes a sovereign 
position: it comes to us from elsewhere, from a place of which no 
One can Weak* But if the transcendental security blanket of 
absolute truth can be purchased only at the cost of suppressing 
a) the fact of its discursive construction, and b) the voices of 
history's many others, then this is simply too high a price to 
pay. This is precisely what Joan Scott argues when she summons 
feminist historians to join her in adopting a deconstrutive 
Deconstruction refuses the costly sham of truth, 
transcendent and absolute, shimmering eternally above the emDiric 
contingencies of history. Moreover, deconstruction reveals how 
that which philosophy excludes -- difference, scission, 
antagonism -- are in fact internal to its rnakeup.8 gy 
foregrounding these antagonisms (conceived as textual rather than 
social, pace Marx), Derridals deconstructive weapon permits the 
identification of the primary binary opposition on which the text 
or concept rests -- the notional polarity "representation vs: 
truth," in this case. The critic then identifies the suppressed 
meanings on which the apparent unity and stability of the primary 
term (truth) in fact rests. What was one man's security 
(absolute truth) is undoubtedly,another woman's tyranny, as is 
testified by feministst repeated revelation of the negative 
characterizations of women as other on which the "truth" of male 
identity has rested. Deconstruction thus breaks open the 
coercive unity of a truth which has purchased its inner coherence 
at the cost of suppressing the heterogeneous voices of history's 
many others. 
But the issue which.confronts feminist scholars9 is 
solely a question of language, though language is deeply 
implicated in both the form which this problem has assumed and in 
the search for solutions. Rather, it is a problem of how it is 
we conceive of the historical subject as a knowing being, and how 
we understand what kinds of knowledge are available to her.1° 
The political and intellectual stakes of this inquiry are 
considerable. In denying the possibility of genuine contact or 
exchange across the bodily boundaries of socio-biological being, 
the highly restrictive epistemological base of identity politics 
narrows the scope of human knowledge, and limits the possibility 
of constructing new kinds of communities. Moreover, it declares 
any hope of envisioning the shape and direction of diversely 
constituted human communities a vain and false one, a priori, for 
there can be nothing outside the fragmentary and localized 
conceptions of particular interests. As I will argue below, 
deconstruction does not really provide an answer here. There Is 
no doubt that Derridats discovery of indeterminacy and un- 
decidability in the text offers a marvelous weapon for debuking 
received wisdom and the notionally stable philosophic/ 
ontological orders on which transcendent truth rests. Hnwever, 
the fragmentation of both subject and knowledge, and the 
concornit-ant collapse of social relations into textual ones, 
diverts our attention from the operation of power in the social 
sphere, fixing our gaze upon its metaphcrical manifestations in 
the text. 
This paper explores several different ways that feminist 
scholars have sought to work through the dilemmas posed by the 
politics of identity. The discussion focuses on three recent 
books: Joan Scott, Gender and the Politics of History, Jessica 
Benjamin, The Bonds of Love, and Carolyn Steedman, Landscape for 
a Good Woman. In each case, I ask how it is that the author 
conceives and connects language and experience, identity and 
difference, in the formation of the subject as a knowing being. 
I begin by examining some of the consequences which the adoption 
of deconstructive strategies carries for historical research. 
This part of the paper argues that the dec~nstructionist effort 
to rescue identity politics by de-stabilizing existing categories 
is, by itself, insufficient. In fact, Derrida's campaign to 
expose the totalizing aims of truth has had the ironic effect of 
locking the deconstructionist in a contest waged on terms defined 
solely by modern metaphysics. By doing battle with received 
notions of human nature and community, necessity and freedom, 
deconstruction remains negatively bound to the very modern 
philosophies of consciousness it is sworn to destroy, I then 
turn to the work of Jessica Benjamin and Carolyn Steedman, 
gcholars. who avoid the sterile engagement with philosophy and 
take an entirely different road into the issues of experience, 
social difference and the formation of identity. By recasting 
our notion of the subject, Steedman and Benjamin mark Some 
possible routes out of the political and epistemological bind in 
which we are placed by a post-modern theory which cpriceives 
knowledge as an archipelago -- isolated islands of experience 
which may be connected at some deeply submerged level, but as it 
stands, only the tip of each volcano peers out above. 
Joan Scott's Gender and the Politics of History seeks to 
discover, define, and put into practice a feminist politics of 
history, to find a theoretical stance and method which will 
enable scholars to advance the cause of equality, founded on the 
ground of difference. The essays gathered in this collection 
include reviews of contemporary scholarship., in which she employs 
deconstruction as a tool of critical analysis, and a set of 
historical pieces, in which she puts her chosen strategy into 
practice. Each piece is animated by the conviction that gender, 
history, politics and the politics of history in the academy 
cannot be treated each in isolation from the other.11 
Scott is clearly troubled by the epistemological 
consequences of identity politics, produced by what she terms 
"the unilinear account of experience, identity and  politic^."^^ - 
She seeks to exit from this dilemma through the past- 
structuralist discovery that two of the terms.in this chain -- . 
experience and identity -- rest on a pair of discursively 
produced fictions: that of truth (which she conflates with the 
extra-textual realm of "reality"), and that of the coherent, 
centered subject. Moreover, if thP "will to truth" is immanent 
in the very structure of western language, if we cann~t speak 
without engaging in the (ultimately futile) search for this 
extrinsic and unchanging realm of ultimate reality, then 
deconstruction of our own analytic categories forms an essential 
step in the postmodern exit. Scott thus links her ?lea to 
implement deconstruction, as a method of unmasking the textual 
operations of the powerful and recuperating the fost voices of 
the powerless, with the call to supplant "women" and "class" 
with "gender" (defined as the social organization of sexual 
difference') as, the privileged category of analysis.13 
When she deploys deconstruction against the gendered 
categories which structure so much contemporary historical 
scholarship, Scott reveals the power of deconstruction as an 
instrument for textual criticism. I was especially taken with 
her sharp and elegant exposure of the particular binary 
oppositions -- irrational-rational, mystical-poetic, female-male 
-- which underwrite the narrative and argumentative structure of 
E.P. Thompson's Makina of the English Workinq Class.14 gut when 
she lifts the deconstructionist sword against discourses about 
women workers- in 19th century France, deconstructicn as 
historical method abruptly shrinks to different proportions, 
Master of the single text-in-the-here-and-now, it appears somehow 
1ess.than adequate when waved against misogynists past.15 I n  
many ways, these historical excursions are wonderful essays, rich 
in detail and filled with important and novel insights about 
women, work and the contours of late nineteenth century political 
economy. But troubling elements lurk on the edges of these 
dazzling exercises. On the one hand, the deconstructive approach 
allows Scott to demonstrate how a range of texts artificially 
stabilize the primary binary oppisition on which their 
a.rgument(s) rest, in each case repressing what it actually has in 
common with its dark (generally female) "other." The central 
dualism thus stands revealed as an unstable fiction, permitting 
Scott to uncover a world of conflicting meanings within the text. 
On the other hand, Scott's account of these artificially 
stabilized categories is oddly static. For example, one gets no 
sense of how it is that the hierarchic distinctions which 
underwrote male and female work identities -- the distinction 
between city and countryside, home and workshop, desire ~ n d  
reason -- were successively gendered (then neutered) over time, 
In deconstructing the language of anti-ferninisms gone by, Scott 
has directed her analysis away from questions of change in favor 
of a synchronic explication of how texts and discourses "work." 
The deconstruction of discourse past is further marred by 
Scott's casual attitude toward the problem of analyzing texts in 
their historical context. For exampte, in an otherwise 
enlightening piece entitled "L'Ouvriere, mot impie . . . , "  the 
reader finds herself wondering why Scott has privileged 
particular texts and discourses about woman workers, highlighting 
the work of Julie ~aubiG and Jules Simon, for example, rather 
than choosing a more widely read liberal economist like Lerny- 
Eeau1ieu'16 The choices are interesting,17 and one can imzgine a 
number of very good reasons for turning our attention to these 
voices. But Scott does not make her case explicitly, beyond the 
stance, implicit in her adoption of deconstruction, that i t  is 
language which constitutes social being, and therefore language 
itself which has agency in history.18 Her choices therefore 
seem arbitrary, and the reader remains uncertain about how to 
locate the insights gleaned from deconstructing these discourses 
on the broader socio-political landscape of late 19th century 
France. 19 
In Scott's work, then, deconstruction proves to be a limited 
tool of historical analysis, hampered first by inadequate 
attention to the importance of situating text in context, and 
second,by Scott's failure to bring to bear her explicit concern 
for explaining changes in time on the synchronic analysis of text 
and discourse in 19th century France. I think both problems can 
be traced to the paradoxically metaphysical pre-occupations of 
Jacques Derrida and his deconstructionist disciples. In their 
struggle to unmask and subvert the universalist pretensions of 
truth transcendant, Derrida (and, by extension, Scott) remain 
transfixed by a conception of truth-as that which stands 
of time.20 Imbued with a clear political 
purpose (to lift the oppressive weight of that unitary truth from 
the backs of history's excluded others), the deconstructi~nist 
has fixed her eye on the timeless, unchanging and linguistically 
ordered world of philosphic truthS2l In so doing, she has set 
aside both history and the realm of the social: the site in which 
truths of a different order arise, truths (or realities, if you 
will) which are never fixed and unchanging precisely hecause they 
rise, shape-shift and fall in' time.22 
Among other things, these metaphysical fixations lead Scott 
to blur the distinction between textual and social relations. 
Scott thus exposes the underlying instabilities in the text only 
to locate them in a matrix where social relations are conceived 
as analogous to a Saussurean model of language: a world in which 
the identity of one term emerges solely through i.ts 
differentiation from others. Once in place, the polarities 
freeze. There is no room in this linguistically-ordered world 
for change, nor can one trace an alternative path to 
subjectivity, for instance, viewing identity as the fluid outcome 
of a more dialectical process, something which arises at the 
confluence of both identification and differentiation. In such a 
world, historical subjects dissolve under the postmodern gaze: 
they are as fictional as the grail of singular truth which they 
have traditionally pursued. 
Scott's deconstructive strategy thus conflates Truth and 
history, textual relations with social relations. The 
unsurprising outcome of a11 this is that Scott is more concerned 
with gender as a metaphor for power than with gender as a lived 
and labile social relation. Relations of power as an 
inescapable facet of social life recede from an analysis which 
seamlessly collapses history into narrative, socisl relations 
into linguistic ones.23 The subject as such disappears 
altogether, a fictive unity imposed on a shifting kaleidescope of 
identity fragments. For the historian, it is perhaps more 
productive to turn to a different kind of scholarship alto~ether, 
work which is concerned with understanding how categories like 
experience, subjectivity and identity arise and shift in time; 
work which seeks to grasp notions of difference (self and other) 
in a matrix of social as well as textual relations; work which 
conceives the realities which arise in time as fluid yet knowable 
entities: work in which the world is seen not simply as textual 
analogue but as a combination of that which is given, that which 
has been constructed already and that which is in the process of 
being constructed; a world in which others are present, and not 
simply represented. 
If Scott's call for new methodological approaches 
reverberates with Derridean overtones, then the postmodern voice 
which echoes through The Bonds of Love and Landscape for a. Good 
Woman is surely that of Michel Foucault. Both books explore the 
vertical lines along which power constructs its objects as 
subjects. By asking different questions of the power-knowledge 
relation, however, Benjamin and Steedman are able to push beyond 
Fbucaultls vision of power relations shaping the subject "from 
the top-down." Steedman's book draws our attention to the 
disjuncture between power and its many objects, as revealed in 
the gap between narratives of working-class childhood and the 
trajectories.prescribed for such lives in literary, psycho- 
analytic and sociological models of deprived childhood. When 
these childhoods refuse to follow the prescribed trajectories, 
the models stand mute and incomprehending, silenced by the 
unexpected integrity of these lives lived out on the margins.24 
Benjamin shares Foucault's interest in understanding the peculiar 
stake which the dominated acquire in their own domination, Her 
exploration of what motivates the two parties to this "master- 
slave dialectic" (the borrowing from Hegel is conscious and 
intended) leads her into the barely charted land of inter- 
subjective encounter, to suggest that the c~nstitution of 
subject and knowledge might occur through mesns other than a one- 
way exercise of power. 
In their own ways, then, Steedman and Benjamin each point 
feminist theory away from the that among differently 
constituted beings, no communication or encounter is possible. 
By allowing marxism and psychoanalysis each to interrogate the 
other, Steedman opens to middle-class readers a hitherto closed 
world of working-class childhood experience. Benjamin engages 
more directly with the manichean world view which informs the 
work of Derrida and his disciples. Thus, for Derrida, and Scott, 
the confrontation of a term with its repressed other issues in z 
struggle between polar opposites; the primary term must either 
annihilate or be annihilated.25 Benjamin opposes this manichesn 
logic with the notion of subjects meeting in mutual recognition; 
a positive encounter between unlike beings where polarization znd 
the subsequent destruction of the "weaker" party does not 
inevitably follow. 
The key to mutual encounter lies in what Benjamin terms the 
paradox of recognition -- a simultaneous embrace of the other's 
similarity to and difference from the self. A truly mutual 
encounter, in which the existence of each is affirmed in her 
recognition by the other, demands that each party be able to 
sustain the tension between asserting the self and recognizing 
the other. But sustaining this tension turns out to be a tall 
order under the best of circumstances, and well-nigh impossible 
in a culture which has organized itself around the principle of 
male supremacy. Inevitably, the paradox of recognition breaks 
down; the dynamic tension of mutuality gives way to an 
antagonistic relation which freezes each party in the asymmetric 
and complementary poses of subject and object. 
Once the paradox has failed, she who finds herself on the 
. . object end of the encounter can find recognition only 
vicariously, through identification with her oppressor. Thus 
the breakdown of mutuality "resolves" into the antithesis of 
dominator and dominated. It is a reversible connection; the 
asymmetrical relation of dependency between subject (who requires 
the object for recognition) and object (who strives for . 
recognition via identification with the subject) can be inverted 
without altering its gendered fixity. But once the possibility 
of mutuality has been supplanted by polarity, equality is no 
longer possible; the terms can be inverted but complementarity 
and asymmetry, once established, are there for the duration. 
. . 
In Benjamin's view, all relations of domination hsve their 
origin in this "twisting of the honds of love." Her book 
explores how these twisted honds constitute individual gendered 
subjects and social orders in which the hierarchies of race and 
class are inflected by gender. Here, she stakes a broad c l a i m :  
that all relations of inequality are underwritten by the kind of 
gender polarity which Scott's deconstructive move reveals. By, 
exploring the genesis (in time) of this polarity at the 
interwoven levels of culture and the individual psyche, Benjamin 
is able to offer a historical account of how it is that equality 
and difference have been lined up as the asymmetrical antinomy on 
which (among other things) liberal conceptions of social and 
political equality rest. Thus, Scott has shown that the modern 
liberal democratic polity views equality as the zppropriate 
relation among like beings. Difference implicitly becomes the 
ground for treatment.26 This discovery raises a number 
of interesting and important questions, among them why it Is that 
some differences, notably race, class and gender, have been 
deemed relevant criteria for excluding humans from the Iihersl- 
democratic political arena, while others -- - lik- -- - IQ -- have not. 
Benjamin provides a structural and historically-specified ground 
for probing such questions. Her geneological tracing of gender 
polarity moves us beyond exposing the textual operation of binary 
oppositions and into the psychic and social structures which work 
daily to reconstitute these unstable oppositions. The Bonds of 
Love thus offers a compelling account of how it is that the 
"other" in any relation of inequality is feminized, and suggests 
why, in Denise Riley's words, there can be "no easy passage from 
'women' to 'humanity. "'27 
Benjamin's argument turns on a reconsideration of Freud's 
classic argument, in which the intrapsychic drama of individual 
development recapitulates the great epic of civilization's 
founding moment, when the sons, overwhelmed by remorse for their 
crime against the father, accept the yoke of paternal law. 
While this argument is rarely taken as an example of good social 
theory, psychoanalysis has adopted Freud's retelling of Oedipus's 
miserable fate as the "master narrative" of the human passage 
from little savage to acculturated being. Benjamin enables us to 
rethink this account, reminding us that although Oedipus is 
preeminently a story about fathers and sons, its apparent reserve 
on the subject of women carries a disturbing, if all-too- 
familiar messa e: that women definitionally lack ,agency and 
subjectivity. 2 8  
This message is reinforced at every stage of' the oedipally- 
structured narrative of individual (male) development. Hence, 
even in the pre-oedipal phase, Freud represents the infant's 
desire for -connection with the mother as a dangerous longing for 
return to the dark, primal swamp of our origins. As progressive 
beings, it is our task to escape the archaic world of 
undifferentiated unity with the mother, to use identification 
with the father as a means of escaping dependency (on the 
mother), and attaining the blessings (and contradictions) of 
autonomous adulthood in oedipal culture. Of course the road 
forward will look very different to a girl, since the optinn of 
identification with'paternal authority is not truly open to her, 
at least not directly. But both male and female must push 
through their versions of oedipal conflict or risk the Dionysian 
descent into a mire of dependency and undifferentiated unity with 
the mother. 29 
By figuring the mother as a danger to be fled rather than a 
someone to encounter, Freud forecloses on maternal subjectix7ity 
from the outset. This denial is further compounded at the moment 
of oedipal conflict. Here, the male child discovers himself n1113 
his own agency by entering into a doomed effort to best the 
father and possess his mother. In the process, he discovers his 
own limits (in age and power! and his difference (from the primal 
mother). Further, he learns to accept the rational rule of 
patriarchal law, a law which masks the hrute reality of paternal 
power, and enjoins him to bide his time until he, too, can sccede 
to the power of the father. 30 
By this time, the mother has heen reduced to a contested 
point on the oedipal triangle, while her daughter has faded from 
the picture altogether. And, since the mother has never been 
encountered, difference is never really come to terms with; the 
boy simply flees from it. In the Oedipal world, then, "the ideal 
type of femininity (constituted by whatever is opposite from 
maculinity) absorbs all that is cast off by the hoy as he flees 
from his mother '''gl The end-products of oedipal struggle -- 
autonomous male subjects, dependent, objectified women, and a - - - 
gender polarity which underwrites a host of social differences, - 
- thus emerge from a telling of this legend which stresses the 
child-male versus adult-male struggle for recognition, a str~~ggle 
which happens over the body of the non-subject mother. 
What Benjamin makes clear is that the Oedipal model 
constructs difference as polarity, and genders each pole by 
organizing the child's own sense of powerlessness and exclusion 
in highly gendered ways; it cannot escape the child's notice thzt 
t h e  mother is merely a contested point on the triangle, and never 
a contesting subject herself. The central cnmponents of 
recognition - being like and being distinct - get split into 
irreconcilable opposites; the gaze of recognition, with its 
simultaneous embrace of similarity and difference; is s~~pplanted 
by the extremes of utter identification (with the father) and 
denial of any similarity (to the mother). The tension of 
. similarity-and-difference is thus polarized into a rigid antinomy 
of absolute difference. 
Benjamin questions the necessity and inevitability of 
Freud's oedipally-structured telos from two angles, Ou the one 
hand, she systematically demonstrates how the Oedipus tr&gedy, 
as recounted by Freud, offers a particular constellation of 
social relations, and a particular connection between fact and 
value, as the universal human condition. But she also argues 
against the proposition that pre-oedipal life is nothing more 
than an unedifying passage through the treacherous sea of our 
origins. Rather, she observes that the intersubjective space32 
in which to work through the core conflict -- hetween ahsoli~te 
self-assertion and the more mutual goal of recognition -- first 
opens up be+ween an infant and her primary caretaker,33 in the 
pre-lingual world of the pre-oedipal child. 
Benjamin's case rests on reshaping our notion of the 
infant's inner life; replacing Freud's inward-looking "his 
Majesty the baby" with an interactive pre-oedipal, one who seeks 
to discover and move on the boundary between self and another 
(the mother!. Far from foundering in mute, dependent oneness, 
these babies are beginning to ponder the idea of self an? other, 
and to experience both the pleasure of the other, as similar and 
different, and the threat and pain (of loss, abandonment! which 
that difference entails.34 ~f Oedipus is the myth around which 
intrapsychic life has been organized, the peaceful, sensual 
images of madonna and child which Kristeva sees in the wnrk of 
Giovanni Bellini may well be the metaphoric frame for conceiving 
intersubjective encounter in the pre-lingual world of the infant, 
Suffused in a golden light, mother and child are bound by a chain 
of dialectics: the child demands, the mother is independent; the 
mother is seductive, the child is free; the mother supports the 
child in hands which both hold and restrain the wriggling energy 
of the infant. This is a far cry from the Dionysian dance of 
death in which Freud locks the archaic mother and her inward- 
turning infant.35 
Inter-subjective theory thus stands against the monadic self 
as a closed system and social space as a landscape populated hy 
these atomized and similar beings. It "attributes 311 agency 
neither to the subject with his innate capacities or impulses nor 
to the object which stamps the blank slate of the psyche with its 
imprint. It argues that the other plays an active part in the 
struggle of the individual to creatively discover and accept 
Social life can thus be conceived as a constant re- 
working and re-experiencing of the paradox of recognition, in 
which similar-yet-different beings encounter the agency both of 
self ' and other. 37 For Hegel, Freud and all others who have 
sought to theorize the interaction between like-yet-\~nlike 
beings, the tension between self and other always breaks down, 
because self-consciousness always strives to be absolute, 
Benjamin does not dispute this as description of our current 
condition. In fact, she stresses how easily the tension of 
recognition can polarize into the extreme postures of a self 
seeking absolute certainty of itself through affirmation of this 
sovereign self in another.38 Instead, she ~reudls ,accolnt 
of the Oedipal drama to demonstrate why the paradox of 
recognition ineluctably breaks down in our culture, and why the 
poles of "master-slave" (subject-object) are coded male and 
female, even when the participants are divided not by gender but 
by class or race. 
The eternal and universal tale of Oedipus thus proves to be 
the organizing myth of a particular, modern, western culture, 
Indeed, the cultural particularity of Freud's reading is 
underscored by the fact that the social and moral world which 
first told Oedipus's tragic tale (fifth century Athens) wrn~ld 
never have produced so radical a statement of the individual's 
autonomy and social isolation.39 When the oedipal wor1.d becomes 
the entire world (as it does in Freudian theory* where the post- 
Oedipal phase is only vaguely sketched and successful Dassage 
through the shoals of oedipal conflict represents the p i n n a c l e  o f  
human development), the father's monnpoly on desire, subjectivity 
and individuality takes on the aura of s priori truth. A f l ~ n r y  a ---  -. is 
therefore sexual agency. Women are indeed creatures who lack, 
as Aristotle and his progeny have not hesitate? to point out. 
What they lack, however, is not the phallus but desire itself; 
the stuff of which agency is made.40 
Benjamin thus uses intersubjective theory to sugr;est that 
the intrapsychic process of splitting and separation -- 
differentiating self and other into a world of atomized and 
irreconcilable others -- may not be the sole route to selfhood. 
The failure of the paradox of .recognition: it's "resolution" in 
the polarity of recognized master and recognizing slave, is 
clearly rooted in the tenacious structures of oedipal culture and 
current childrearing practices. But it .is not inevitable, In 
the intersubjective arena, identity can emerge from complex 
encounters with real others. Here lies the hope that we might 
learn something new, about each other and about ourselves. 
For Carolyn Steedman, the hope for something.new in the 
world also lies in hitherto ill-explored spaces; this time, in 
the gaps which open between power's own conception of its reach 
and extent and the observable truth of how it actually functions 
in the world. The disjuncture between power structures in the 
-working-class household and those which arc validatk? in the 
. world outside allows the child to periodically sight "fractures 
- within the system we inhabit."41 c he slippage creates spaces in 
which working-class children learn something different, something 
other than that which the system seeks to impress upon them. 
Through an artful weaving of history with autobiographical 
and theoretical reflections, Steedman takes the reader on a 
rather different journey through the oedipal organization of 
subjectivity and social difference. Here, attention to the 
distinctions of class also puts the "universal" myth into its 
place, this time as the tale of particular (middle-class.! 
families. Oedipus as a story of paternal power is knocked off 
balance in families where the father is a relatively powerless 
individual in the larger social world. As this comprises 3 
fairly large number of fathers (and children), Steedman's 
question "how does the myth work when the father is rendered 
vulnerable by soci.al relations?" is not easily shrugged. off by 
Juliet Mitchell's assertion that wed< or absent fathers present 
no problem for a patriarchal power which has symbolically 
inscribed itself in the ordering of social life.42 ~ f ,  for 
example, the father is all-important within the four walls of his 
own castle, but watchful and deferentiai outside them, then the 
child is witness not only to differences in age and sexi but also 
to distinctions in social power. 
As working-class autobiographies testify, children are often 
present to and cognizant of their fathers' precarious social 
position; "the humility of a domestic tyrant witnessed at his 
workplace, out in the world."43 This does not mean that the 
domestic tyrant does not partake of patriarchal power. But it 
does have consequences for the process whereby working-cl3.s~ 
children learn about themselves as classed beings, for it is in 
such "fractures" that many working-class children acquire 
knowledge of self and social difference. At the very moment when 
they are coming to terms with difference (age, sex and power) 
within the household, and doing so in part through 
identification with the father, their emergent sense of 
powerlessness is also organized by their observation and 
assimilation of the fact that father's position is not confirmed 
by the social world outside the front door.44 
To the extent that psychoanalysis cannot relinquish its 
universal structures of mind, limned in "eternal" myths like 
Oedipus, the discipline is one which cannot come to terms with 
the fact that children learn something else in households where 
the father is weak or simply not there.45 A theory which can 
proclaim the father "just as present in his absence" is theory 
which has abandoned its central project, namely, that of 
explaining how it is children learn about self and difference46 
And a theory of learning stands at the heart of Steedman's 
multivalent investigation of the process whereby working-class 
children, dwelling outside the structures of producticln, come to 
understand exclusion, d.ifference and social position. 
But Steedman is less concerned with deposing Oedipus than 
-with specifying its explanatory reach by exposing and ex~loring 
disjunctures in the notionally smooth intersection between 
paternal and s@cial structures of power. Hence, while state and 
society continue to uphold paternal law as a principle of social 
and political order, it is difficult to ignore the fact that the 
actual content of paternal rule simply does not articulate with 
the broader thrust of state law in families which fall outside 
the system; where the father is either so weak as to render thc 
Itrule" of the father a source of very different lessons, or where 
the father's exercise of paternal privilege constitutes "law" r1.I.n 
wild, destroying the very bodies which the sta%e asks that 
families shape and nurture. In such casesi it is both 
descriptively and conceptually inadequate to say that the state 
"becomes" the father. As Landscape for a Good Woman indicates, 
something far more complicated is going on, something which our 
theory is bludgeoning beyond recognition and into line with its 
own predictions. Those elements which.cannot he wedged into the 
glass slipper get relegated to the margins, in theory and in the 
social world itself. 
Steedman's book travels on the border between histcry and 
literature, recounting stories which do not rest easily within 
the available interpretive frames. By looking squarely at what's 
out there to be seen, by assuming that she who does n ~ t  f i t  slso 
has a story t~ tell, Steedman does more than give voice to a 
previously voiceless other. These tales, which have no resr-7nanre 
except, perhaps, on the margins whence they came, mark the 
"aporis," the spaces where the logic of current theory fzils. I n  
her own mother's resolutely Conservative politics, for" example, 
Stpeaman hears material lack etching both deference and enx7y onto 
the s o u :  "Conservatism was the only political form which allowed 
her to reveal the politics of envy . . .  she knew she was like them, 
or would be if only the world would let her be what she really 
was ' ' "47 But if psychoanalysis has &en insufficiently class 
conscious, marxism has also missed the mark in failing to imagine 
class consciousness as psychological consciousness. By winding a 
Freudian notion of desire in and around the concept of class 
consci?usness, Steedman shows us how material deprivation shapes 
our acquisition of the goods of the soul. She can then tell the 
making of a working-class conservative without resorting either 
to the condescensions of false consciousness, or to Stedman- 
Jones's pro,blematic rendering of working class conservatism as 
solely a product of rhetoric.48 "Bad" politics can lodge just as 
surely as good in the minds and hearts of those who lack, not 
just agency but "New Look" coats. This cannot be willed away as 
simply an "effect" of language.49 
Toward the end The Bonds of Love, Benjamin suggests that the 
:-breakdown of paternal authority: "men's loss of ahsoll~te cnatrol 
- -  over women and children" in modern western society has expose? 
the oedipally-constituted male's inability to encounter the 
- independent reality of the other. As the system cracks apart, 
man's failure to recognize the other, a failure "which pre\.Tiousl\7 
wore the cloak of power, responsibility an? family honor," drops 
the mask of patriarchal duty (the good father) and steps forth in 
its true guise-50 In an interesting echo of Engols, Steedman 
suggests that this process is already well advanced within the 
multitude of unimportant, "dysfunctional" families who dweil in 
class societies.51 When she peers into the systemic faults which 
.- have opened around the failure of paternal power to dnve.taiL wirh 
social power, Steedman finds lurking not only weak fathers, hut 
daughters and mothers who are, to some degree, in possession of 
themselves. Because production -- of goods (exchange values) and 
of babies -- has social meaning under late capitalism, these 
women experience agency both through their power to labor and 
their power to produce children. This discovery has profound 
consequences, for one's sexuality and one's labor can he 
sold/alienated on a daily basis. Yet neither is truly separable 
from the self. The sense of self-possession to he gained from 
transactions in which women render themselves "both the subject 
2nd object" of their own exchanges must necessarily be pzrtial 
and contradictory. 
Landscape for a Good Woman thus contains a few surprises for 
those who would characterize women as definitionally lacking 
subjectivity. It suggests that one of the lessons imparted in 
the space between the father's domestic and social power !nay !>e 
some sense of female agency, however constrained or incomplete, 
This impression grows stronger as we read of families in which 
mother and (in this case) daughter continue to encounter one 
another as subjects. In the encounters which Steedman describes, 
recognition is burdened with the tensions of desires 1-~nfl~lfilled 
and needs unacknowledged. But these are not the ossified 
asymmetries of subject-object complementarity, though they may 
have hardened in other respects. They are encounters which. 
produce knowledge far beyond the boundaries of Steedman's own 
experience. Indeed, Landscape is perhaps most striking for the 
ways in which knowing and understanding constantly spill across 
the boundaries of bodily being, carried hy sympathy, imagination 
and self-knowledge. 
None of Steedman's tales from the margin can be rendered 
intelligible unless we recognize that material deprivation 
produces "unfulfilled states of desire." Until class 
consciousness is conceived as psychological consciousness, the 
stories from those who inhabit the fractures -- the father who 
"didn't matter" and the mother who, knowing that she awned 
herself proceeded to "exchange herself for a future" -- will 
continue to bounce off the uncomprehending ears at the center, 
Steedman thus asks her reader to consider what the relationship 
is between knowledge, social position and structues of feeling, 
especially desire, envy and loss. This question leads to 
speculation about where the transfer points may lie for some 
useful transactions between marxism and psychoanalysis, Marx's 
concept of alienation is clearly one such point. Careful re- 
working of Oedipus, broadly conceived as our conflict-driven 
passage into culture, may well be another. 
I 
Steedman's layered text implies that any reconciliation of 
the two will alter the shape of historical narratives, for the 
two paradigms work with radically different notions of time. 
Marxism moves in what Walter Benjamin has called "homogenous, 
empty time:" historic time which can be filled and marked-off by 
linear narrative.52 Psychoanalysis shifts between historic time. 
in which individuals develop and act in the worid, and the space 
taken out of time which is unconscious life.53 Childhood, as "a 
kind of history, the continually reworked and re-used personal 
history that lies at the heart of each present" is the device 
which enables Steedman to move easily between the two kinds of 
time-spaces.54 Through the excavation of particular working- 
class childhoods, Landscape for a Good Woman begins the work of 
theoretical reconciliation, while offering a glimmer of future 
horizons in the powerful arid hitherto unheard tales which 
Steedman can now tell. 
I11 
At the silent outposts of the postmodern world, where 
"language comes to u from a place of which no one can speak," 
Steedman and Benjamin remind us that if silence is death, then 
perhaps it is language's communicative function which will 
restore life to our vigion of subject and social world. 
"Language is the human invention par excellence, and the 
fundamental instrument of cultural freedom that gives the 
individual access, heyond his subjective self, to other 
subjectivities, both alive and dead. ..we are all members of one 
another through As Steedman and Benjamin both 
attest, language's communicative function holds, despite the 
postmodern revelation that language as representation cannot give 
us a transparent world.56 And it is the possibility of 
communication, of meaningful encounter across the boundaries of 
difference, which will allow us to reconfigure subject, knowledge 
and community. 
If modern feminism has been saddled with "the identity of 
women as an achieved fact of history and epistemology,"57 then 
it is not surprising that feminist scholars have sought tn loosen 
the bonds of womanhood through the postmodern suspicion of truth 
and the self-enclosed subject. There is, after all, a liberating 
aspect to the argument that categories like "woman" are empty 
vessels, filled at will by those who control the discursive 
floodgates. If the "reality" of woman is merely a useful 
- .  fiction, constructed to suit the interests of the ~ o w e r f ~ l ,  then 
- surely resistance consists in relentlessly unmasking the 
- falsehood. Hence, Derridals frontal assault on "truth" aoes .- 
- offer an escape from the narrow labyrinth of femininity, Eut the 
- cost of liberation is very high indeed, for in the course ~f 
exposing unstable fictions like'"~oman,'~ deconstruction 
forecloses altogether on the possibility of an authentic, 
meaningful subjectivity. In a world where difference is 
absolute, a11 encounters between similar-yet-different beings 
must necessarily issue in a struggle to the death: truth is 
either absolute or the deadly lie of the powerful, s~~hjects are 
either the radically separate selves of a frozen master-slave 
dialectic or they are useful fictions, produced by the will 
truth/power immanent in the metaphysics of truth. In this all- 
or-nothing universe, only two outcomes are possible: either Truth 
will prevail, and the master will assert himself ahsolntely, or 
the critic can shatter the coercive unity, of absolute truth ?ni 
the transcendental subject, and so unleash the repressed voices 
of history's many others. In the name of freedom, deconstrection 
must destroy the only subjectivity it can see -- the self- 
enclosed subject of modern western philosophy. In so doing, it 
denies the possibility of any genuine subjectivity whatsoever, 
Resistance via deconstruction can therefore give US only 
half a strategy, one which de-centers "woman" 2s text~l-al/pn~izl 
construct, while leaving aside the dilemmas of women, w h ~  mnst 
live as subjects in time. This is no small oversight, for as 
Denise Riley points out, the category "woman" always conflates 
the attributed with the imposed znd the lived.59 For those who 
live in society, sexual difference is not s~mething which car1 
simply be argued into a corner and then left behind. Rather, 
individuals must inhabit those gendered categories even as they 
strive to unmake them. This paradoxical condition will never be 
resolved so long as we invoke the constructedness of "woman" in 
order to ?void the tangled knot of subjectivity. Hence the 
importance of works like Bonds of Love and Landscape for a Goo+- 
Woman. Here, identities rise not as iron masks but as fluid 
bases for coherent thought and meaningful intersubjective 
encounter. Without accepting the rigid and universalist baggage 
of the metaphysics of presence, both Benjamin and Steedman manage 
to preserve the subject as a knowing being. 
One of the great achievements of postmodern philosophy has 
been to break apart the western tradition's great chain of 
power/knowledge/being. But levelling this hierarchy has also had 
its costs, one of which has been death of the subject and her 
resurrection as an isolated locale of contingent, experlent21 
understanding. By rescuing the historical sub>ect, Steedman and 
Benjamin make it possible to imagine how one might begin to 
reconnect these isolated locales of experience not with the 
vertical structues of transcendent truth, but with horizontal, 
communicative bonds.59 prom here, perhaps one can build theory 
that will enable us to find those human truths which are 
knowable, even as the singular conception of truth has heen 
deposed from its pride of place, truths which bridge those bodily 
boundaries and provide non-coercive bases for community, Such 
theory should itself be able to sustain Benjamin's paradox of 
recognition, where encounters between similar-yet-different 
creatures do not end in the imaginative obliteration of the 
"weaker" party. By holding the similarity and difference of 
history's many others in simultaneous view, our common humanity 
could no longer be used to bludgeon our particularity, when the 
acknowledgement of difference no longer entails loss, of self or 
community, perhaps then we can turn our eyes outward in order to 
find who it is we truly are. 
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